What the Cambodia–Thailand Ceasefire Agreements Establish… and What They Leave in the Shadows

On 27 December 2025 at noon, the Cambodian and Thai governments announced a bilateral ceasefire, the result of discussions by the 3rd Special General Border Committee (SGBC) — the joint military-diplomatic body tasked with managing border incidents.

Réfugees from Preah Vihear. AKP

After several weeks of armed tensions, the goal was clear: stop hostilities, stabilize front-line positions and allow civilians to resume normal life while technical dialogue on the border could resume. But just days later, a degree of uncertainty persists: what do these documents actually set, and more importantly, what do they deliberately leave undefined?

Visible Barriers, Invisible Interpretations

In the days following the announcement of the ceasefire, international media documented the installation of large physical barriers — piled shipping containers — in the Ban Nong Chan sector on the Thai side, facing the Cambodian village of Chouk Chey. Bangkok authorities do not deny their existence; they justify the measure as an internal security initiative in areas “where claims still overlap” while awaiting conclusions from joint border committees. The fact that the wall exists is not disputed — its legal and political meaning is.

Phnom Penh Rises the Tone

On 3 January 2026, Cambodia’s foreign ministry issued an official protest. Phnom Penh accuses Thai forces of continuing the destruction of civilian and cultural structures even after the ceasefire took effect — notably at Chouk Chey and other named localities.

The Cambodian government says these actions prevent displaced civilians from returning home, despite that being a central obligation in any cessation-of-hostilities agreement.

Phnom Penh even speaks of “persistent illegal occupation” that undermines the work of the Joint Boundary Commission (JBC) — the technical body responsible for mapping the official border. While Cambodian authorities claim to hold satellite evidence of demolitions, they have not made that evidence public — an absence that, Arnaud Darc notes, “separates allegation from independent verification.”

Bangkok Pleads Sovereignty

Thailand’s response, published on 2 and 3 January 2026, immediately rejected any claim of “occupation.” According to Bangkok:

• The military actions occurred entirely on Thai territory or in zones of contested status, as part of strict security prevention.

• Thailand insists it is respecting international law and the terms of the ceasefire, and underlines that final border demarcation is still pending technical clarification.

Notably, Thailand does not deny restricting access to the Ban Nong Chan area — instead arguing that this should not be equated with violating Cambodian sovereignty.

“The two positions do not conflict on the material facts — the wall exists — but on their legal meaning.”

What the Ceasefire Actually Imposes

The 27 December 2025 text of the ceasefire, at the heart of the de-escalation effort, sets several specific obligations:

• Safe return of civilians to their homes.

• Freezing of military deployments and cessation of any defensive construction.

• Prevention of any act that could aggravate the situation.

Oversight of these commitments is entrusted to the ASEAN Observer Team, a regional mechanism accepted by both countries. This team is charged with supervising and documenting the ceasefire’s implementation, in coordination with bilateral frontier units. These rules thus function as a temporary code of conduct — applicable before a definitive solution to sovereignty issues. The ceasefire governs behavior, not the border itself.

A Timeline of Incomplete Agreements

The sequence of documents highlights this gradual process:

• The Putrajaya communiqué of 28 July 2025 established the first cessation of hostilities and launched the idea of monitoring mechanisms.

• Subsequent meetings of the General Border Committee (August–October 2025) consolidated de-escalation measures, without specifying how they should be implemented locally.

• The 27 December 2025 text is new in integrating the clause on “return of civilians,” but it still avoids the sensitive ground of contested villages.

In other words, the body of agreements seeks political time, not operational procedures essential for a return to normalcy.

Institutional Gaps

This is where the problem lies. None of the documents details:

• How civil access should be managed in villages under disputed control.

• The existence of any temporary humanitarian corridor.

• A joint administration or supervision regime for daily civilian transit.

Even the ASEAN observer mission — crucial in theory — remains without defined contours: no schedule, no transparency obligations, no published reports mentioning conditions in Ban Nong Chan or Chouk Chey.

The result: an implementation gap where neither Thailand nor Cambodia seems obliged to initiate verification, leaving commitments suspended pending future consultations.

When Silence Becomes Strategy

In this institutional void, respect for the ceasefire is reduced to the absence of gunfire. In other words, as long as there are no armed exchanges, any “preventive” expansion can be justified without literally violating the agreement.

This semantic shift has very concrete effects: armed peace. Civilians remain trapped in a legal grey zone.

Some testimonies from Chouk Chey — relayed by external outlets — report families still prevented from returning home, while Bangkok describes the same area as under “legal control of contested territory.” Two competing narratives exist without canceling each other out: one of occupation according to Phnom Penh, another of necessary security measures according to Bangkok.

Mechanisms to (Re)Activate

To break this stalemate, a return to the procedural spirit of the original text is needed. Two instruments already exist on paper:

1. The Joint Boundary Commission, responsible for technical demarcation issues.

2. The ASEAN Observer Team, meant to guarantee on-the-ground monitoring.

But these mechanisms need transparent, public mandates.

At minimum, analysis suggests:

• A joint verification of civilian access to frontier villages.

• A published map of barriers and their relation to current administrative lines.

• Creation of temporary access modalities for civilians without prejudging future demarcation.

A Conclusion in Suspension

As of 4 January 2026, no official timeline has been announced — either by the Joint Boundary Commission or the ASEAN observer team — for field operations in the so-called Ban Nong Chan–Chouk Chey zone. The ceasefire holds, but its implementation remains patchy.

In sum, available documents show that the dispute is not primarily one of sovereignty, but a problem of governance of the ceasefire itself.

The agreement has silenced the guns — but has not yet organized the resumption of civilian life in legally ambiguous zones. The real battlefield now may no longer be the front line: it may be transparency itself.