War, profits and illusions of peace: Why the Thai army is perpetuating the conflict with Cambodia

The Thai army and government's stubborn refusal to engage in sincere peace talks with Cambodia stems mainly from their interest in maintaining a façade of permanent crisis, which benefits the country's political and economic networks. Whether it is control over casino cash flows, maintaining a privileged position in the economy, or preserving a favourable political order, resolving the border dispute would risk weakening hidden rents and the power of the military.

Thai army soldier with an M16A1 (cc)

More than simply defending contested sovereignty, this stubbornness can be explained by a complex web of economic, political and territorial interests in which the underground flows of border casinos play a central role.

The economic interests of the Thai army

A sprawling economic empire

The Thai army is not content with a security role: it owns, manages or influences a vast network of companies covering real estate, transport, media, trade, hotels and leisure.

Nearly 20% of the board members of state-owned companies are military personnel, including in non-military sectors such as railways, water services, hotels and retail chains. This economic omnipresence generates billions of baht in revenue for the army each year.

Opaque management, limited parliamentary oversight and a lack of audits reinforce the temptation to preserve this privileged status and even extend the rents generated by economic grey areas, away from public scrutiny. Any instability at the border, under the guise of national defence, can be used to justify this expanded power.

Border casinos: ‘white elephants’

But one sector in particular is attracting attention: the border casinos on the Cambodian side in Poipet, Koh Kong and Pailin. These complexes generate billions of baht each year and mainly target Thai customers, who are not allowed to gamble on their own soil.

Thai interest groups, including former MPs, high-ranking officials, influential entrepreneurs and local godfathers, hold discreet stakes in these casinos, often through shell companies or nominee shareholdings.

The temporary closure of border posts or tighter controls directly affect casino profits and, as a result, the windfall enjoyed by certain Thai military and political networks. Maintaining ‘controlled’ tension allows for the selective opening or closing of border crossings to be negotiated, thereby favouring certain economic interests over others.

Officially, in response to the recent upsurge in military clashes — which saw the closure of border posts and a ban on Thai workers travelling to casinos in Poipet and neighbouring regions — the army has cited national security and the need to control flows, particularly those linked to gambling. In principle, the aim is to protect nationals, prevent incidents between communities and address concerns about cross-border crime, money laundering and mafia networks surrounding these establishments.

In reality, Cambodian casinos are thriving precisely because of the gambling ban in Thailand. Areas such as Poipet depend on Thai customers attracted by games that are prohibited in their own country. According to many observers, the grey economy generated by the casinos could become a lever of power, or even a source of political funding, which the Thai army cannot ignore.

The army's recent measures – closing border posts, controlling crossings, issuing official warnings to citizens about the gambling sector – are officially explained as a desire to limit the influence of these structures, which are perceived as threats to sovereignty and public order. However, in the background, the debate over future legalisation, or even the creation of ‘integrated resorts’ in Thailand, is stirring up the corridors of power and business. This is because certain military figures, politicians and businessmen, some of whom are linked, would welcome the integration of the casino sector into the formal economy in order to better control its revenues and stem the flow of capital to Cambodia.

In short, the Thai army is publicly displaying a firm, preventive and controlling attitude towards border casinos. However, the complexity of local and transnational networks of interests makes the border porous to the influence of gambling: it is a shifting terrain where security issues, economic calculations and political power struggles intersect.

Before the conflict, Thailand wanted to develop its casino sector officially for economic and strategic reasons:

• Attract more tourists and compete with the region: By legalising casinos, the country hopes to attract more international visitors, particularly from Asia, thereby strengthening its position against destinations such as Singapore and Cambodia, where gambling is already a substantial source of income.

• Increase tax revenues: The government aims to generate significant revenues from gambling taxes, licences and various levies, which will be used to finance infrastructure and social programmes.

• Stimulate foreign investment and create jobs: The development of casinos, often integrated into large tourist complexes, is seen as a driver of private investment and a creator of direct and indirect jobs.

• Combating illegal gambling: By formalising the sector, the government hopes to reduce the influence of underground networks, channel money into the official economy and exercise better control over gambling practices.

• Bringing back money spent abroad: Many Thais currently gamble in casinos in neighbouring countries, which represents a loss of revenue for the national economy. The government is therefore seeking to recoup this financial windfall.

Nevertheless, this project raises concerns about social risks such as addiction and debt, which explains the stated desire to accompany the reforms with strict prevention and regulation measures.

Officially, the Thai government's gamble is to transform an informal sector into a lever for development while attempting to limit its excesses.

Political interests: perpetuating military power

The army as the supreme arbiter of Thai politics

For decades, the army has acted as the self-appointed guardian of the nation and the monarchy. Coups d'état are frequent, executive power is regularly controlled or influenced by generals, and the military apparatus exempts itself from ordinary budgetary or judicial controls.

A context of conflict or external threat allows the army to justify the continuation of the state of emergency, strengthen its autonomy and image, and limit the scope of democratic reforms demanded by Thai civil society and youth.

This cycle has been observed in southern Thailand, where peace talks are only opened under pressure but are never followed by substantial concessions.

Diversionary strategies and internal consolidation

The existence or prolongation of a border conflict also serves to rally the conservative camp around the army, divert attention from internal crises (economic or political) and marginalise dissenting voices accused of ‘compromising with the enemy’.

Nationalist rhetoric is used to rally public opinion by demonising Cambodia.

The refusal of international mediation and the stated preference for ‘bilateral negotiations’ are typical of this stance, which aims to control everything and resist external pressure for substantial reform.

Territorial issues: more than a border dispute

The sensitive issue of the border demarcation

The main clashes in 2025 took place around disputed forest areas, ancient temples and resource-rich lands. The issue of the border demarcation, inherited from the colonial period, is regularly used as a rallying cry and exploited as a political tool.

In fact, recognising an international demarcation or accepting binding arbitration could threaten land or economic interests established through the interplay of local political and military networks.

The army emphasises the argument of national sovereignty, which lends itself to all kinds of escalation, and the defence of ‘sacred’ or strategic territories to justify maintaining the status quo.

The detention of Cambodian soldiers: a bargaining chip

The Thai army is still holding 18 Cambodian soldiers captured after the fighting, arguing that they violated immigration laws, even though two wounded soldiers have been handed over to Cambodia.

Officially, Bangkok claims to respect international humanitarian law (care, food, respect for the Geneva Conventions), but is maintaining diplomatic pressure through prolonged detention, treating these prisoners as a means of negotiation or political blackmail.

This refusal to speed up their release reflects a desire to remain in control of the diplomatic tempo, while sending a message of firmness to Cambodia and, above all, to Thai public opinion, which is keen to see a strong stance.

The Thai army's attitude towards peace negotiations

Officially, Thailand continues to hammer home its ‘resolute’ commitment to ending hostilities and resolving disputes peacefully, both in bilateral meetings and before ASEAN. However, the reality is that ceasefires are frequently violated, mutual accusations of breaches of agreements are made and, above all, any form of international mediation or arbitration is rejected.

More fundamentally, peace is only really desired insofar as it preserves the current balance of power and influence of the military apparatus.

With each lull, new pretexts are put forward for not moving forward on the issue of border demarcation or the opening of border crossings, particularly when this would disadvantage those who benefit from the current situation.

Is the conflict being exploited?

In practice, cycles of border tensions have become a kind of ‘bargaining chip’ allowing the military to demonstrate its central role in defending the nation — if necessary, against reformist public opinion — and to maintain a controlled war economy.

 All this serves as a smokescreen for trafficking and networks of influence whose very existence would be threatened by real and lasting peace on the border.

Peace in the face of multiple interests

The prolonged captivity of Cambodian soldiers is merely a reflection of this logic: they are being used as pawns in a game where peace is, for the time being, nothing more than a slogan and not an end in itself.

Ultimately, peace on the border will only be possible if Thai society imposes a redefinition of the political and economic role of the army, the police and clientelist networks. Without this reversal, the border will remain a theatre of confrontation, corruption... and hidden profits.